We propose that policy-making in the realm of innovation policy can be fruitfully analyzed from the perspective of Behavioral Political Economy. Citizens, policy-makers and also bureaucrats are prone to biases that have been empirically identified in behavioral economic and psychological research. When applied to innovation policy, it can be shown that under certain conditions, policy-makers are willing to support riskier innovative projects and that this tendency is amplified by public sector incentives, such as soft budget constraints. The same holds for a tendency to support ongoing innovative projects even if their profitability becomes increasingly doubtful. Finally, we also highlight how special-interest policies aimed at distorting risk perceptions can slow down the innovation process.
Introduction
Joseph Schumpeter, one of the pioneers of evolutionary and innovation economics, was also a -largely overlooked -pioneering voice of the economic theory of politics or what later generations referred to as 'Public Choice' (e.g. Mueller 2003) or 'Political Economics' (e.g. Persson & Tabellini 2000) . 1 Intrigued by the observation that the incentive structures facing voters differ markedly from those that consumers face in the marketplace, he concluded, with characteristic sharpness:
"[The private citizen] expends less disciplined effort on mastering a political problem than he expends on a game of bridge … Thus, the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his private interests. He becomes a primitive again. His thinking becomes associative and affective." (Schumpeter 1942: 261-62) While the standard economic approach to studying the political process has mostly applied neoclassical rational choice modeling routines, Schumpeter's observations proved too powerful to ignore: Already Anthony Downs, in his path-breaking Economic Theory of Democracy (Downs 1957) , conceded the need to adjust orthodox motivational assumptions: When voting alongside millions of others, the individual voter (whose vote is effectively just "one drop in a vast sea", ibid.: 244) could hardly be assumed to instrumentally invest in the effort to go to the polling booth, let alone to acquire the knowledge needed to 'master a political problem', as
Schumpeter put it. The former problem has become known as the voting paradox, while the latter gives rise to 'rational ignorance'. Thus, additional assumptions were called for to at least avoid the 'embarrassing predicament' of not being able to explain the act of voting itself (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974: 525) . Downs (1957) , for instance, speculated that real-world voters may be driven by a "sense of social responsibility" or subscribe to some norm of upholding democracy, but he did not elaborate, fearing that including non-instrumental variables might be methodologically risky (ibid.: 261ff.).
All this shows that the pioneers of the economic approach to politics were at least aware of the limits of standard rational choice theorizing decades before a field called behavioral economics started to transform the economic sciences in general. In other words, Schumpeter and Downs came close to what we refer to as 'Behavioral Political Economy' avant la lettre. This is remarkable, since after surveying the general impact of behavioral economics on the economic theory of politics recently, our impression was that while there certainly was an influence, almost no one in the field really acknowledged as much explicitly (Schnellenbach and Schubert 2015) . 2 We coined the term 'Behavioral Political Economy' (henceforth BPE) to denote all attempts to explicitly use behavioral economics insights in order to advance our understanding of the political process. 3 We distinguish between 'weak' and 'strong' BPE:
While the former merely alters specific auxiliary assumptions on either agents' mental resources or the content of their utility functions, the latter tries to actually explain (rather than only postulate) motivational or other psychologically informed extensions of the standard model. Note that we exclude contributions from BPE that only incorporate information asymmetries or uncertainty into an otherwise standard setting. 4 In this paper, we demonstrate that BPE can be usefully applied to innovation policy. We
show that some typical inefficiencies in practical innovation policy can be associated with behavioral biases of policy-makers and citizens. As a possible remedy, we argue that a more rule-based and less discretionary approach to innovation policy could reduce the harm done by biased individuals in the political sphere. We should also note that in this paper, we focus exclusively on the political decision-making process on innovation policy, and on the impact that biases and heuristics have on this process. We do not focus on behavioral responses in the firm to policy instruments such as R&D subsidies. There is a separate literature focusing on such behavioral responses, which in turn does not include explanatory models of the political process (e.g. Clarysse et al. 2009 ). Both pillars of the literature complement each other.
The paper proceeds as follows: After a brief introduction to the basic tenets of BPE as applied to the actions of voters, politicians, and bureaucrats (Section 2), we will give a brief introduction to innovation policy from a BPE perspective (Section 3), discuss biases and heuristics in this area of policy-making (Section 4) and derive some lessons for policy-making in the concluding Section 5.
Behavioral Political Economy: What the approach is about
2 An application to the fashionable area of behavioral public policies (such as nudges) is suggested by Schubert (2017) . 3 To be sure, the term has been used before, but with wildly divergent meanings. For instance, Della Vigna (2009: 364) defines BPE as the study of "how politicians change their behavior to respond to voter biases". Berggren (2012) defines the field, also rather narrowly, as the application of the analytical tools of behavioral economics to "political decision-makers". See also Wallerstein (2004) . 4 See Schnellenbach and Schubert (2015: 396) for details. See also Viscusi and Gayer (2015) .
Behavioral Political Economy is a branch of the economic analysis of the policy-making process that deviates from the assumption of full rationality when explaining political decisionmaking. These deviations can come about through two distinct channels. On the one hand, and somewhat paradoxically, individuals can rationally decide not to act as assumed by the established rational choice approach to politics. For example, voters who anticipate that the probability of being individually decisive is zero can rationally ignore any material consequences of their preferred policies. Instead, they could for example focus on the utility they gain from expressing some specific personal identity through their vote. Approaches that assume rational deviations from the standard rational choice approach fall into the category of weak BPE.
One of the most active research areas in this area of BPE is the theory of expressive voting. Hamlin and Jennings (2011) , for instance, define the expressive elements of voting behavior as reflecting "benefits from the act of voting that neither derive from its instrumental nor from its consumptive value, but from its symbolic or representational aspect: not from the act but from its meaning" (ibid.: 5). A colorful analogy is offered by Brennan and Buchanan (1984: 186, 196) , likening expressive voting to cheering at a sport event, in an attempt to "show preferences as such". Only individually inconsequential choices are "purely expressive" (Hamlin and Jennings 2011: 649) . That's why the voting booth is a place most likely to encourage expressive action. Voting offers the citizen an opportunity to express her views about the public interest. A related model, by Brennan and Hamlin (1998) , assumes that, to the extent that elections are dominated by expressive considerations, people vote for positions that they perceive as being sufficiently close to their personal "expressive bliss point".
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The category of strong BPE, on the other hand, includes approaches that incorporate predictable, systematic biases into the explanation of political decision-making. One of the most original contributions in this respect in recent years has been Bryan Caplan's account of 'rational irrationality': Voters are not only rationally ignorant (which would still allow the minority of well-informed voters to shape election outcomes, since the knowledge gaps and errors of all the others would neutralize each other), but rather subject to predictable biases when processing the little information they do ultimately process. The basic idea had already been suggested by Akerlof (1989) : people consume beliefs. Certain beliefs make them feel good and are cherished for that reason. Information that challengers those beliefs tends to be discarded (Cowen 2005 'starve the beast' belief, according to which spending cuts will automatically be followed by tax cuts, thereby gradually reducing all government activity (Baron and McCaffery 2008) .
While experience tells us that tax cuts tend to be followed by increased public debt, the heuristic lives on, for it serves as a valuable ideological signal towards certain groups of voters. In another context, namely behavioral public policies, naïve policy-makers may systematically underestimate the effectiveness of policy instruments -specifically, of nudges -which may lead to excessive nudging (Schubert 2017) . 6 An important result of studying the evolution of beliefs in the political arena is that today's policies often exert an influence on tomorrow's beliefs -policy-making then becomes path-dependent and real (i.e., irreversible) time starts to matter (e.g. Dixit 1996; Boettke et al. 2013 ).
Innovation policy viewed from the perspective of BPE: Some core characteristics

Complexity and uncertainty in innovation policy
Innovation policy is a field of economic policy where clear-cut, general recipes for policymaking are largely absent. The ambiguity already starts with the normative question whether one should implement policies that encourage innovation at all. Looking for rationales for having active innovation policy at all, Fagerberg (2017) finds that, even though there are longstanding doubts on the academic side of the debate, the view of knowledge as a public good is still an important argument among political practitioners: If knowledge is a non-excludable public good, then firms will under-invest in knowledge-production when left to themselves.
Stylized facts about the innovation process cited by Fagerberg show, on the other hand, that non-excludability is seen as a minor problem by firms themselves, which tend to focus on firstmover-advantages instead in order to rationalize their investments into innovation.
Without an empirically robust theory of market failure in the production of knowledge, however, the normative foundations of innovation policy are much less clear. Political practitioners in particular often appear to act on the presumption that more innovation is better than less innovation. While this may be a simple und useful heuristic political agents, it is not obvious that it could be supported by sound welfare-theoretic reasoning (Schubert 2012) . Innovation regularly creates losses for some individuals, at least in the short and medium term, for instance through structural change that can be associated with high individual adjustment costs. Also, individual preferences may change, which makes it difficult to apply conventional welfare measures.
8 When in such a context of unclear normative foundations the openness to innovation itself is used as a benchmark, without reference to individualistic foundations, this may in itself already represent an innovation bias -a bias to support policy measures that are advertised as promoting innovation without critically weighting their implications in detail.
Besides the unclear normative foundations, complexity is a second important characteristic of innovation policy. This becomes transparent in the literature on national and regional systems of innovation (originally Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1992) . This theoretical concept stands in sharp contrast to linear models of innovation, where direct causal links between specific, single policy measures such as investment into scientific research and innovation outcomes are assumed. Instead, emphasis is put on the argument that markets can be embedded into different institutional frameworks, and that heterogeneous agents and organizations act within a variety of such institutional frameworks (Lundvall 2007: 19) .
Furthermore, network structures within which knowledge is created and shared are taken into account, as well as levels of competence for different tasks in the innovation process that differ between agents and organizations.
On the micro level, Bloom et al. (2017) observe a secular decline in research productivity over time. They attribute this to the fact that new ideas become harder to find when the knowledge base in a specific field is increasing. They demonstrate this tendency for semiconductors, agriculture and health science. An efficient allocation of funds in innovation policy would need to take this effect into account. For example, if a research field is of high societal importance, but already in the range of very low research productivity and thus of little interest to private firms, this may warrant active innovation policy in this field. But identifying research productivity, and approximating the effect of innovation policy itself on research productivity across fields adds to the complexity of policy-making.
These considerations lead to a more realistic, but also much more complex model of the innovation process. Policies that may be successful within a certain setting may be likely to fail in a different setting. Understanding the interaction of different elements of a system of innovation is crucial in order to determine the effects of different policy measures on innovation outcomes.
Innovation policy from an evolutionary perspective
On a very general, stylized level, the instruments of innovation policy can be categorized according to the part of the innovation process that they are intended to alter. Typically, these are (Fagerberg 2017) : knowledge, skills, demand, finance and the broader institutional framework. In addition to this distinction, one could also differentiate between firm-and industry-level interventions on the one hand, which aim to change innovation processes in a specific firm or industry, and institution-level interventions that change the general rules of the innovation process and concern all innovating organizations in a system of innovation. The former interventions require extensive foresight concerning the potential of firm-and industrylevel targets to successfully improve their innovation outcomes conditional on appropriate policies. A pessimist could, in a Hayekian mold, speak of a "pretense of knowledge" on behalf of the policy-maker (see also Frenken 2017: 44) . This caveat is less relevant for the latter interventions, where less specific foresight regarding the prospects of single firms or industries is required, and the goal is to improve the institutional framework for all individuals and organizations involved in an innovation process.
In general, however, the path-dependence in the evolution of systems of innovation and the fact that innovation policies need to be tailored to the very specific conditions of a given status quo both imply that successful innovation policies can only to a relatively small extent rely on generic rules and recipes. This in turn implies that the policy-makers' intuition and subjective understanding of a situation become more important relative to policy areas where more linear causal relations can be taken as a starting point. Finally, the feedback from political results is also likely to be more ambiguous. For example, in the case of failure of a policy measure, it may be difficult to discern for the policy-maker whether this is due to an inefficiency 7 of the policy itself, or because some necessary complementary conditions were not taken properly into account. Witt (2003) argues that taking an evolutionary perspective on policy-making will not lead to an entirely new concept of economic policy. It adds, however, a new perspective to existing theories. Crucial to this perspective, he argues, are bounded rationality and social cognitive learning (see also Meier and Slembeck 1997) . Such a perspective appears to be particularly important when the field of policy analyzed is characterized by a high level of complexity, as in the case of innovation policy. The subjective perceptions that policy-makers and voters have of the problems to be addressed by appropriate policies are not necessarily congruent with the actual mechanisms at work. In contrast to earlier rational choice approaches, evolutionary theories of policy-making have always seen this as an important issue, and were interested in particular in the social dynamics of the emergence and change of subjective
perceptions. An example is the modeling of the formation of public opinion on an issue as a process of social contagion. In this paper, on the other hand, we emphasize the importance of psychological biases and thereby incorporate the behavioral economic approach into the analysis of innovation policy.
The heuristics and biases that are central to BPE can inform an approach that focuses on the analysis of social cognition on possible individual-level starting points and constraints regarding subjective perceptions of problems of innovation policy. Within a highly complex and ambiguous setting for decision-making as it is often found in innovation policy, it is likely that policy-makers rely to a great extent on heuristics and are also more prone to biases which would be smaller in decision situations with less complexity and quicker, more straightforward feedback on the efficiency of policy measures. In the following Section 4, we will discuss some examples which illustrate how heuristics and biases can influence decision-making within the realm of innovation policy.
The robustness of biases
One possible objection to our argument is that biases can be overcome, e.g. through boosting (Hertwig 2017) , or that heuristics can be used in a useful way by individuals in dealing with uncertainty (Gigerenzer 2008) . Boosts aim at improving the decision-making competencies of individuals themselves, for example by training them or by giving them transparent information that improves their decision-making capacity. Boosts are typically conceived as tools that policy-makers can use in order to help consumers pursue their own objectives more efficiently.
In the BPE framework, boosting would require that policy-makers are conscious of their 8 shortcomings and thus decide to look for ways to boost their own competencies. It is not impossible that this happens, at least among specialized politicians or government technocrats who need to make similar decisions repeatedly. Furthermore, strong political competition might provide an incentive for individual politicians to improve their decision-making skills themselves. However, this would require citizens to engage in well-informed retrospective voting, which is not very likely in particular from a BPE perspective (Schnellenbach and Schubert 2015) . Furthermore, citizens themselves likely suffer from similar biases in forming their policy preferences.
The argument of Gigerenzer (2008) is that individuals can learn, often subconsciously, to use heuristics that are well-adapted to certain decision-making situations. This allows them to make good decisions at low cognitive cost. Gigerenzer presents convincing arguments that the use of heuristics is indeed often rational if one takes the cost of following the established concept of full rationality into account. However, there is no evidence so far that heuristics used by policy-makers are well adapted to the specific decisions they face -in other words, the level of ecological rationality (Smith 2003) in politics may be low. The problem that significant decisions on policies are neither made frequently, nor repetitively, and are not associated with quick feedback and learning, casts some doubt on the prevalence of ecological rationality in politics. While we cannot exclude that ecological rationality may occasionally be found in policy-making, our examples in Section 4 illustrate cases where ecological rationality has not occurred. We believe this is important, because this is where biases and the use of heuristics can be associated with very high social cost, and where learning to avoid these mistakes could be associated with a significant improvement of policy-making.
The behavioral biases discussed here are deep-seeded psychological mechanisms. In addition to this, the class of decisions -decisions on innovation policy -are case-by-case decisions. Each comes with its own narratives, with different agents and organizations involved, and with different economic boundary conditions. It is therefore unlikely that technology, e.g.
in the form of standardized decision-making routines based on large amounts of data, can solve the problems sketched here. Trends like digitization and big data likely will change the way private firms act and organize, but there is at least no obvious way how they could lead to an unbiased use of the instruments of innovation policy. For example, the evaluation of a proposed project requesting R&D subsidies relies on conjectures about a singular proposed innovation entering a market that might be transformed by the innovation itself. Under such conditions of (Knightian) uncertainty, and without similar cases providing data, it is difficult to see how a digitization of innovation policy could lead to unbiased decisions.
Heuristics and biases in innovation policy: some examples
In the following subsections, we illustrate the possible impact of biased decision-making in the realm of innovation policy. We do not aim to give a full overview over the entire catalogue of biases and heuristics that may be relevant. Instead, the aim is to exemplify the relevance of BPE for innovation policy, using case studies. The cases concern different stages of the innovation process. The overconfidence bias is particularly relevant for the decision to grant political support to a certain innovative project at all. Similarly, loss aversion may induce politicians to become risk-friendly, and to support particularly risky projects. The sunk cost fallacy concerns the unwillingness to discontinue such a project once it has begun, even if new information surfaces that casts doubt on the efficiency of further support. And the case involving availability cascades illustrates that once an innovation has come to be market-ready, there may be an irrational willingness to engage in strict regulation or even to erect market barriers against innovative products and services. We therefore try to show that BPE can be applied to every stage of innovation policy, and that behavioral caveats should be taken into account with regard to every aspect of innovation policy.
The overconfidence bias
The overconfidence bias is a distortion of individual decision-making that is of particular concern to expert decision-makers faced with uncertainty. Alpert and Raiffa (1969) have conducted an experimental study where subjects were asked to assess a probability distribution whose true characteristics were unknown to them, based upon limited information given to them. The confidence intervals around the estimated true value of an uncertain quantity that subjects have given turned out to exhibit a tendency to be too narrow. In other words, subjects were too confident of their point estimate of the true value of an uncertain quantity.
A problem associated with a too optimistic evaluation of one's own decision-making capabilities is an upward bias in willingness to pay. If one is very certain that, for example, a business project one has decided to pursue will be successful, then the result is a willingness to invest irrationally large amounts into that project. This has subsequently been demonstrated in a wide range of settings, inside and outside of the laboratory. In particular, it has been shown that overconfidence of this type prevails in individuals who are experts in their field (Massey and Thaler 2013) . Experience and access to relevant information do not reduce the 10 overconfidence bias, but may even amplify it, as both inflate confidence in the quality of one's own decisions.
With regard to entrepreneurship, empirical evidence already supports the conjecture that excessive entry into markets by entrepreneurs can be explained by the overconfidence bias (Camerer and Lavallo 1999) , and again, this effect is exacerbated by experience (Hooshangi and Loewenstein 2016) . Furthermore, willingness to pay for entrepreneurial projects increases when competitors threaten to enter if subjects do not take on the project themselves. Examples from politics for the presence of overconfidence bias include the decisions to go to war (Johnson 2004 ) and a strong ideological polarization among citizens (Ortoleva and Snowberg 2015) .
In the context of innovation policy, decisions to support specific innovative projects, for example through subsidies, are likely to be particularly prone to an overconfidence bias.
Entrepreneurs who are (overly) confident with regard to their projects encounter bureaucrats and politicians whose task is to distribute available funds. Given re-election concerns, the latter are primarily interested in short-and medium-term successes. Voters remain rationally ignorant, because they have little incentives to invest into discerning the true likelihood of success of a proposed project. Ignorance, often combined with low salience of single projects in the political discourse, provides some scope for discretionary policy-making without tight ex ante control by the citizens. Furthermore, costs and benefits are unevenly distributed along the time-line. If it is framed well by the policy-maker, a public subsidy for some supposedly innovative project buys positive expectations immediately, while costs in the form of write-offs of unsuccessful public investments occur (sometimes much) later and are with some positive and often non-trivial probability borne by a later government of competing political colors.
Thus, there are few hard constraints that reliably impede overconfidence in these kinds of decisions.
The relatively prominent CargoLifter case is an example that can be used to illustrate the significance of the overconfidence bias in innovation policy (see Titze 2005 for detailed background information). The project's aim was to develop a transportation technology for large-volume goods using very large blimps. It had originated among a circle of engineers and experts in technology, and it had also been a demand-push technology. Several large firms which had been producing large-volume goods were looking for a more efficient transport technology than wide-and heavy-load trucks on streets. Nevertheless, large economic risks remained. While the technological concept was generally plausible, the volume of investments needed to solve all technological problems necessary to reach a market-ready stage was largely uncertain. Indeed, it turned out that initial estimates of necessary investment levels were significantly underestimated. With higher than expected necessary investments, however, the economic viability of goods transportation by blimp quickly became increasingly doubtful.
In spite of the uncertainties, the entrepreneurs behind CargoLifter successfully gained subsidies from the German state of Brandenburg of around 40 million Euros in 1998, i.e. in the very initial stage of the project. These subsidies were conditional on the creation of at least 239 jobs on the site of development and construction in a structurally weak region in the south-east of Brandenburg. Only four years later, in 2002, technological uncertainties materialized into concrete problems. Capital markets were reluctant to provide the necessary additional financing, and so were federal and state governments at this later stage. Eventually, an insolvency was inevitable in August 2002.
In this case, the state government had limited its losses by refusing to inject further capital in 2002. This was, however, primarily due to high debt levels and relatively tight budget constraints binding the state government at that time. Moreover, in 1998 the state government gave the highest legally admissible amount to support the project (Titze 2005: 71) . The responsible decision-makers saw this as an opportunity to prevent a further slump in the already structurally weak region. But in this situation, they also appeared to weigh the opportunities associated with the project relatively high, and at the same time underestimated the risks associated with the existing technological uncertainties.
The sunk cost fallacy
The sunk cost fallacy is also well-documented in the empirical literature (see already Thaler 1980) . It is observed when costs that have been incurred in the past and that are non-reversible nevertheless influence decisions concerning present and future actions. Intuitively, the most obvious problem associated with the fallacy is that "good money is thrown after bad money", i.e. that projects are continued because past, sunk investments have been made even when the prospects of future economic or other success are slim. Problems also occur if individuals feel obligated to overuse a resource after having paid a high price for it in the past (Arkes and Blumer 1985) .
More recently, there has also been some skepticism regarding the uncritical and premature assumption that observed behavior is due a sunk cost fallacy (see in particular
McAfee et al 2010). Following this argument, sunk costs may for example have informational content if overall costs of a project are uncertain. In this case, costs already invested are negatively correlated with the expected value of future costs necessary to complete a project;
thus, a decision to continue a project should rationally depend on sunk costs. Another, albeit less clear-cut example are reputational concerns. If reputation, for example of a politician or a project manager, depends on completing a project with high sunk costs, it may be rational for the decision-maker herself to take sunk costs into consideration. However, this is conditional on her evaluators irrationally valuing sunk costs, or on the presence of a second-best situation where valuing sunk costs is needed as a device to signal commitment to a team effort.
In the political arena, the signaling function associated with continuing an economically efficient project often has different ends. For example, with voters being ignorant of the expected costs of continuing a project, but aware of past investments, and thus to some degree subject to the sunk cost fallacy itself, the termination of an inefficient project will have negative reputation effects for the political decision-maker. While budgetary costs and also opportunity costs are highly abstract for the individual citizen, the prospect of some big technological or economic achievement often appears more concrete. When such a project is generally popular with a rationally ignorant citizenship prone to the sunk cost fallacy, policymakers face incentives to postpone the day of reckoning. This is in line with the above-mentioned incentive to buy short-and medium-term political success even if long-term prospects of success are doubtful.
Probably the most prominent example in the realm of innovation policy is the development of the Concorde supersonic airplane. This has even led to the coining of the term "Concorde fallacy", which, however, is used predominantly with respect to the sunk cost fallacy in lower animals (Arkes and Ayton 1999) . The project was characterized by quickly escalating production costs, which during a twenty-year planning and implementation period grew by a factor of at least 100, and by exogenous events such as the oil crisis, which should have led to a re-evaluation and eventually a suspension of the project. The economic inefficiency of a continuation of the project was transparent relatively early (Bletschacher and Klodt 1992) .
Nevertheless, the development of the Concorde continued for prestige reasons. Would the same have happened if Concorde had been a purely private innovation project? Most likely not, because only within the soft budget constraint of a government project could the sunk cost fallacy be holding decision-makers captive for such an extensive period of time without running out of resources.
Loss aversion
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) informs us of a systematic tendency of individuals to value losses higher than gains, both evaluated from their current status quo.
Moreover, it also predicts the empirical regularity that individuals tend to be risk-averse if a 13 decision is framed such that potential gains are emphasized, while they are risk-loving if potential losses are at the center of their considerations and the decision is framed such that a risky choice can help to avert these losses.
Innovation policy is often taking place within the context of saving or creating employment opportunities, in particular within processes of structural change. Such processes are associated with the relative certainty of high expected employment losses in declining incumbent industries. At the same time, it is usually not clear which new industries can and will be successful in providing new employment opportunities in the future. This situation fits the description of a loss frame rather well. If prospect theory is also relevant for innovation policy,
we would therefore expect a tendency of policy-makers to facilitate and to subsidize relatively risky innovative projects under conditions of structural change -in many cases also projects that would not be deemed worthwhile in an unbiased, sober comparison of expected costs and benefits.
The CargoLifter example discussed above could also serve as an example for this bias in decision-making. It has been a project with objectively high risks of escalating costs due to technological uncertainties. But the well-documented pressure of accelerating structural decline in the south-east of Brandenburg has favored the willingness to subsidize the project. Another prominent German example concerns the city of Völklingen, in the inland state of Saarland.
Völklingen has suffered for decades from a structural slump in the steel industry, with high associated losses in industrial employment. In 2007, the local public services provider has, with political backing, decided to invest into the high-risk project of establishing an unprecedented saltwater-fish farm in the city, which is located more than 500km from the nearest natural salt water basin. Initial investments for construction of about 16.5 million Euro and accumulated losses during the following years led to a total loss of slightly more than 21 million Euro by 2015. 9 With no hope of ever being able to run the fish farm with a profit, the city eventually managed to sell the site for slightly over 2 million Euro to a private investor.
Availability cascades
The examples of biases in innovation policy discussed so far show behavioral economics can help to explain why policy-makers support too many and too risky innovative projects with discretionary policies. There are, however, also mechanisms in BPE that work in the opposite direction. Kuran and Sunstein (1999) regulation in general. Their analytical starting point is the so-called availability bias, which predicts that individuals will on average over-estimate risks that are "available" to them, in the sense that these risks are currently discussed in public, or have materialized recently. The probability to die in an earthquake (as opposed to dying from a heart attack, say) will, for example, be typically over-estimated by somebody who has recently read a newspaper article on a severe earthquake.
Kuran and Sunstein argue that the availability bias can be used by special interest groups as a lever in the process of policy-making. By emphasizing certain risks in public discourse, they can induce availability cascades where the general public is led to over-estimate these risks, and where experts are reluctant to correct these over-estimations. The reasons for the latter effect are both that experts may, at least in the short run, have little effect in arguing against a settled public opinion and that political opportunism also induces experts to be either silent, or to even support a factually false risk estimate. Special interest groups, on the other hand, benefit not only from supporting their preferred policy with such a political tactic, but also from overstating their own societal relevance as pressure groups fighting important risks that threaten society.
Among the special interests who have an economic incentive to initiate and support availability cascades are of course the incumbent industries whose rents from market power are threatened by innovative entrants. Recent examples are attempts of hotel and taxi businesses to oversell the risks associated with sharing economy innovations in order to protect their business models. In some countries, such as Germany, these attempts have been successful enough to support regulations that effectively protect incumbents from innovative market entrants. Fears of sharply increasing housing prices as a result of apartment sharing platforms, or of safety concerns in transport sharing platforms, help to generate a more widespread support for restrictive regulations than traditional lobbying policies that are directed immediately at political decision-makers.
Conclusion: Some lessons for policy
This short note has attempted to demonstrate how Behavioral Political Economy can help explain some stylized facts that can be observed in policy-making on innovation policies. The political process is susceptible to biases and mis-applied heuristics, and this can lead to major problems. One example is the tendency of policy-makers to support relatively risky innovative projects by means of direct funding from public budgets. Another is the danger of creating a widespread anti-innovation sentiment, which can be politically exploited to introduce policies 15 that protect incumbent rents. As so often in evolutionary economics, the actual outcome in a specific case will depend on the starting conditions in that case. This has led Witt (2003) to propose that in an evolutionary analysis of policy-making, case studies should be conducted that explain the emergence of actual outcomes from the conditions in a specific historical setting. Our examples show that this certainly applies to a behavioral analysis of innovation policy. Given the large number of existing heuristics and biases, it seems to be impossible to predict deterministically under which conditions which bias will dominate, and lead to a certain outcome. Rather, one can only reconstruct which bias may have played a role in a certain situation ex post.
Still, one major lesson is that we can expect innovation policy to be susceptible to biases in policy-making that lead to predictable, problematic outcomes: political support for high-risk projects, overoptimistic predictions on the economic viability of projects, a stubborn attachment to projects that have deteriorated, and also a sentiment in favor of the status quo and against the market entry of innovations. Clearly, not all of these outcomes appear in every case, but from an ex ante perspective, all of these problematic outcomes have a positive probability of occurring.
As already discussed in Section 3, a boosting of discretionary individual decisionmaking capabilities is hardly relevant in the political realm. A reduction of the damage done by behavioral biases in innovation policy could, however, be achieved by reducing the leeway for discretionary policy-making. As an example, take the availability cascades leading to market barriers for innovative goods and services. When such a policy occurs, it is highly discriminatory, protects incumbent rents, and likely reduces consumer welfare. A simple procedural rule that requires an independent scientific council of experts to confirm possible dangers of an innovation before market barriers can be erected could be a pragmatic solution to this problem. It would reduce the scope for discretionary policy-making through additional checks and balances, but not render it impossible.
Similarly, the other problematic outcomes sketched above will not only lead to inefficiencies, but also be discriminatory and distort competition, through a subsidy granted to specific projects but not to others. Again, it may be efficient to reduce the scope for discretionary innovation policy and instead focus on policies that improve the general conditions for innovation. Examples are general subsidies for individual investments into human capital, or general tax deductions for R&D expenditures. In general, a policy approach that focuses on the generic framework of rules and regulations that impact innovative processes avoids the pretense of knowledge that is associated with supporting select, specific projects.
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The detailed knowledge required for the latter is clearly much more difficult to collect than the technical knowledge needed to improve the general conditions for innovative activities. And the more general the approach to innovation policy is, the smaller becomes the danger of a biased evaluation of single projects.
